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 i 
Abstract 
Regional integration is not a new phenomenon but has become an increasingly 
important topic of political research with the continued expansion of the European Union 
as well as an increased number of regional organizations around the globe.  This paper 
will seek to use both Europe and East Asia as illustrations in order to better comprehend 
the driving forces behind integration as well as why some regions are further integrated 
than others.  The purpose of this research is to achieve a better understanding of what 
causes regional integration in hopes of developing a more inclusive theory.  More 
specifically, it aims to see how integrated the region of East Asia is, in particular when 
compared to Europe.  Through comparing the two regions and analyzing factors in both 
Europe and East Asia as determined by current integration theory, this research aims to 
achieve a better understanding of the driving forces behind regional integration as an 
international phenomenon.  My research is an attempt to tie together the multiple existing 
theories of regional integration with the goal of creating a more cohesive and measurable 
theory.  With an increased understanding of regional integration, we will be better able to 
both explain and predict integration in both Europe and East Asia, as well as other, less 
integrated regions around the world. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 What is regional integration?  Political theorists argue about the motivations, 
forms, and depth when defining the term.  However, regional integration can generally be 
seen as nation-states in a territorial region voluntarily deferring sovereignty to 
intergovernmental or supranational institutions in order to better their condition as a 
whole through cooperation.  This integration can be both economic and political in 
nature, though examples from regions around the globe, particularly the European Union, 
suggest that economic integration tends to precede its political counterpart.  Integration is 
a process of both deepening and widening relationships amongst actors.  While widening 
merely involves the extension of the cooperation to more actors, deepening can be more 
complex and controversial in that it requires increased loss of sovereignty on the part of 
the actor, notably a nation-state.  Though this process is not necessarily inevitable for 
actors in the international community, it is a difficult process to reverse particularly as it 
progresses and actors become more intertwined.   
 Both economic and political cooperation are necessary for integration to continue 
to deepen.  Economic integration can begin with a simple preferential trade area 
agreement, moving towards a common market and eventual complete economic and 
monetary union.  Political integration is the movement from completely separate unitary 
states towards federalism and ultimately complete political unification. While the two 
processes can occur separately, they are intimately interconnected and must work 
together in order for either to progress.  The more integration amongst nation-states 
deepens, the more the states will begin to behave as one unitary actor.  
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Throughout the world, integration is beginning to gain momentum in various 
regions perhaps in reaction to increasing levels of globalization.  This paper examines 
regional integration in Europe and East Asia.  It assesses the causal factors behind 
regional integration in an attempt to provide some explanation for why the two regions 
represent different degrees of integration.  The first section of this paper gives a brief 
historical overview of regional integration in Europe and East Asia, focusing specifically 
on the development of the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).  The second section provides a discussion and analysis of current 
theories on integration to set the theoretical model of analysis.  The third section provides 
an overview of the research question and hypotheses of the study and presents the model 
of analysis and data gathering.  The next section is an analysis and discussion of the 
findings.  Finally, the paper concludes with a look at the implications of the findings of 
this research and suggestions for future research.  
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Historical Overview 
While forms of regional integration theory were already in existence, specific 
study of the phenomenon began with a focus on Europe in the early 1950s, shortly after 
the end of World War II.  Post-WWII Europe was left in shambles both socially and 
economically.  After six years of combat throughout the continent, even the victors of the 
war were in vulnerable economic and political positions.  There was a fear of further 
conflict and particular concern over the potential of a reunited and re-empowered 
Germany.  Additionally, there was a region in need of rebuilding both structurally and 
economically after suffering such devastation.   
With a shared need for development throughout Europe, states began to integrate 
through a regional approach to international trade liberalization.  Such an approach to 
economic integration “involves agreements among small numbers of nations whose 
purpose is to establish free trade among themselves while maintaining barriers to trade 
with the rest of the world” (Chacholiades, 1990:222).  Though seemingly purely 
economically based, these “preferential trade arrangements may be influenced more by 
political factors than by economic factors” (Chacholiades, 1990:222).  As integration 
increases between states, their agreements develop from simple preferential trading clubs 
to a free-trade area, customs union, common market, and eventually an economic union.  
“An economic union is the ultimate form of economic integration,” and is formed when 
states fully unify their socioeconomic, fiscal, and monetary policies (Chacholiades, 
1990:225).   
European integration began with only six states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.  Initial post-war discussions on European rebuilding 
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included grandiose visions that called for a “United States of Europe ” (Rosamond, 
2000:103).  However, a more pragmatic and basic approach towards cooperation was 
adopted, starting with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
established by the Treaty of Paris in 1952.  The community was adopted by the six states 
primarily as an economic preventative measure against further war as integrated coal and 
steel production would make any military action significantly more costly and difficult.  
The ECSC led to the first European institutions including the High Authority, a 
predecessor to the current-day Commission, and the Common Assembly, which was the 
predecessor to the current-day Parliament (Europa 2010, Treaties and Law).  Though the 
institutions had limited authority, they were an important first step toward regional 
integration as they constituted a decision-making body that extended beyond the nation-
state.   
After the success of the ECSC, its members adopted the Treaties of Rome in 
1957.  The treaties established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), deepening the member states’ 
integration through increasing the topics of cooperation.  In 1965, the Merger Treaty was 
signed to bring all three communities (the ECSC, EEC, and Euratom) together under one 
encompassing organization known as the European Communities (EC). 
The first process of enlargement in Europe occurred in 1973 with the addition of 
three new members: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.  After the initial 
addition of these new members, enlargement continued at a relatively rapid pace with the 
inclusion of fifteen member states in the European Union by the end of the 20th century.  
Enlargement of the EU was happening significantly more rapidly than deepening, 
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particularly during the 1970s and 1980s.  Perhaps this was because the addition of new 
members was not as controversial an issue as the loss of national sovereignty associated 
with deepening.  However, as enlargement continued at the turn of the century, the 
process became more controversial with the inclusion of less economically developed 
states from Central and Eastern Europe. 
While enlargement was occurring rapidly in Europe, the 1990s and 2000s also 
saw significant deepening of integration in the region.  The Treaty on the European 
Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed 1992.  This was a significant 
move towards deepening regional integration and led to the creation of the European 
Union.  Today there is an impressive level of regional integration amongst the nation-
states in the European Union.  The past sixty years has seen the development of the 
region from unitary, sovereign nation-states to a compilation of intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions though the EU members maintain their status as independent 
states.  Citizens of the member states of the European Union are now not only citizens of 
their own states but also of the EU.  Border traffic is almost completely unregulated 
within the region for both people and goods.  In addition, the last decade has seen the 
introduction of the Euro, a common regional currency signifying the final steps towards a 
complete united European market.   
The member states of the EU are still autonomous in many important ways 
despite their deep levels of integration.   This sovereignty is demonstrated through the 
ability of members to opt out of certain agreements in the Union as well as continued 
state control over many internal operations.  The intergovernmental institutions of the 
EU, while supporting and aiding integration, allow for member states to maintain 
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sovereignty by promoting cooperation through a process of interstate discussion and 
consensus.  However, Europe is gradually developing the ability to act more as one unit 
than as a selection of individual states with the development of its supranational 
institutions, particularly with regards to the economic and monetary affairs on the world 
scene.  This is demonstrated through its common economic and monetary union as well 
as the development towards a shared foreign security policy where a united European 
voice acts for the individual member states.  Today, the EU consists of 27 states and has 
additional states applying for entry.  Though the deepening has occurred less rapidly, 
Europe now exhibits features of advanced integration such as the formation of an 
economic monetary union and regional citizenship.   
Though Europe is unquestionably the most complex integrated region in the 
world, it is not the sole example of the phenomenon.  Others have also signed regional 
integration agreements in diverse regions of the world.  On such region is East Asia, 
which has made significant progress on deepening of integration.  In 1967, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines joined together to form the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The organization’s initial purpose 
was to help foster economic relations and stimulate growth amongst its members.  It has 
since grown to be an important arena for communication and cooperation in the region. 
Furthermore, its membership has expanded to include Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, 
and Cambodia.  While Japan, South Korea, and China are not officially members of the 
organization, they are regarded as the +3 in ASEAN+3 and work closely with the 
organization on economic matters. 
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ASEAN as an organization has developed over its 43 years as a forum for 
international discussion among its member states.  However, it has been slow to 
institutionalize in that the organization has been unhurried to develop active formal 
institutions (intergovernmental or supranational) such as those found in the EU.  In 
December of 2008, the ASEAN Charter was adopted building institutional bodies.  The 
Charter called for the development of the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) and the 
ASEAN Community Councils for the economic, political-security, and socio-cultural 
communities (ASEAN 2010, ASEAN Charter).  These bodies are primarily 
intergovernmental in nature and have significantly lesser regional influence than those 
found in the EU.  However, they are an important step in developing the regional 
organization and deepening integration between its members.1 
As ASEAN’s membership and structure have expanded, so have the 
organization’s goals with hopes of regional peace, mutual assistance, and furthered 
cooperation among its members.  On the 30-year anniversary of ASEAN, its members 
adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020.  The Vision called for a further developed regional 
community that in some ways would resemble that found in Europe.   
The ASEAN Community [will be] comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with the Initiative 
for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-
2015), they form the Roadmap for and ASEAN Community 2009-2015 (ASEAN 2010, 
Overview).  
 
                                                
1 Deepening of integration refers to intensifying the level of interaction and dependency between states. 
This can happen in both economic and political integration. As economic integration deepens, states 
gradually grow from sharing a preferential trade area to a customs union, a common market, and eventually 
a monetary union.  As political integration occurs, states shift from being two autonomous actors to a 
confederation to a strong federation. States integrated at the deepest political level will have fully merged to 
act as a unitary state.  
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While ASEAN is not as integrated as the EU, the organization is an example of regional 
integration in its own right.  Additionally, measures such as the ASEAN Vision 2020 
suggest that the region of East Asia is striving to make further steps in the integration 
process.  
Though the integration of Europe and East Asia discussed above can be seen as a 
mid-20th century phenomenon, regional integration itself is not as new a concept.  
References to the United States are often made as an example of such integration, 
particularly when discussing it through a Federalist viewpoint.  However, the 
phenomenon has become an increasingly important topic of political research with the 
continued expansion of the European Union as well as an increased number of regional 
organizations around the globe such as ASEAN.  What is the driving force behind such 
integration?  What are the costs and benefits in relinquishing individual state sovereignty 
to intergovernmental or supranational institutions?  Why are some regions attempting 
economic and political integration while others prefer state segregation?  These are some 
of the questions that current integration theories are attempting to answer.  
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Conceptualizing Regional Integration 
 Most modern theories of regional integration are Eurocentric and began to 
develop in the post World War II period.  Pre-WWII, international relations theory was 
primarily divided into two camps, realism and liberalism (also known as idealism).  
Traces of these overarching schools of international thought can be seen in the more 
modern, midrange theories on integration.  The midrange theories in this section all 
stemmed out of the grand theories of realism, liberalism, and/or constructivism, many 
adopting tenants from more than one.  Each theory is an attempt to explain integration 
through getting into the specific workings of the process including its actors and 
motivations.  There are a number of midrange theories to explain regional integration.  
This section will deal with ten of the most prominent.  It will give an overview of their 
basic tenants, their vision of integration and its functions, and their relations to the grand 
theories previously mentioned.  The theories’ validity when applied to the integration 
seen in Europe and East Asia will also be discussed as an assessment of the quality of 
evidence behind each theory. 
Intergovernmentalism is a theory of regional integration that stems primarily from 
realism.  For intergovernmentalists, states remain primary, unitary, rational actors2 in the 
anarchic international system.  Integration is seen as an increasing web of state 
interaction.  The more interaction states have and the more they create means to 
cooperate, such as intergovernmental institutions, the more the states can be considered 
integrated.  Integration is not a process of building up from the nation-state but rather 
                                                
2 A rational actor is one that seeks to maximize its expected utility or payoff from any given decision 
through determining the benefits of different possible outcomes minus their costs.  When acting rationally, 
“actors clarify their goals, evaluate their options and determine their preferences, and then make a decision” 
(Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, 2006:165). 
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building bridges between nation-states in order to better foster each state’s main goal of 
pursuing its interests.  In this view, “National interests [arise] in the context of the 
sovereign state’s perception of its relative position in the states system” (Rosamond, 
2000:137).  States integrate and cooperate in attempt to restructure their position in the 
international system and better thrive.  This leads to interests that are primarily focused 
on relative power and security, further demonstrating a realist and neorealist connection.   
Intergovernmentalism is, however, distinguishable from realism in its allowance 
for complex cooperation and potential for including state interests that extend beyond 
national security.  The theory also strays from realist thought through its expectation of 
international institutionalization to help organize state cooperation.  Finally, 
“Intergovernmentalists of various persuasions are distinguished from realists because 
they are attentive to the fact that the (international) politics of European integration takes 
place within a very specific institutional environment” (Rosamond, 2000:141-142).  
While they still see the international system as being anarchic, they take a more neorealist 
interpretation of it in seeing the anarchy as imposing its own pressures and restraints on 
state actors. 
Intergovernmentalists view integration as a function of interstate cooperation 
motivated by individual state interests.  Essentially, it can be seen as an effort by states to 
organize themselves in the international system in hopes of bettering their own position.  
As integration resembles a form of increased strategic bargaining amongst involved 
states, political will is a necessity for its success.  State cooperation results from direct 
national decisions, therefore lack of political will would be crippling to any progress.  
While allowing for international cooperation and institutions, intergovernmentalists are 
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opposed to any form of supranationalism as it would call for a loss of state sovereignty, 
the very thing realist states are trying to avoid.  While restrictive on integration in this 
sense, the theory does not have any restraints with regards to the authority of 
intergovernmental international institutions or the types of politics that they may address. 
In terms of European integration, intergovernmentalism is able to explain such 
institutions as the Council of Ministers as well as the early structuring of the EU where 
states effectively maintained full sovereignty.  Additionally, the theory is supported by 
ASEAN’s development of the ACC, an intergovernmental institution.  However, 
intergovernmentalism falls short in two main ways.  First of all, while explaining the 
intergovernmental institutions of the regions, intergovernmentalism fails to explain such 
supranational institutions as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the Commission.  
Secondly, the theory does not get deep enough into the workings of integration to cover 
all that has happened in the integration process in Europe.  Through strict focus on state 
actors, intergovernmentalism ultimately ignores other important factors that can effect 
integration, in particular domestic pressure and multinational corporations.3  
Similarly to intergovernmentalism, institutionalism views integration as a process 
supported by rational actors attempting to alter their position in the international system 
in order to better suit their interests.  Additionally, both theories share connections to 
realist thought with states as primary actors acting in their own interests related to 
security and relative power.  The main difference between the two comes from 
institutionalism’s focus on the importance of institutions.  For this theory, institutions 
                                                
3 It should be noted that liberal intergovernmentalism as discussed by Andrew Moravcsik does allow for 
the influence of domestic factors.  While similar in seeing international interactions and integration as 
occurring between states, Moravcsik differs from traditional intergovernmentalists in allowing for domestic 
pressure and discussion to influence the state interests driving cooperation.  
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provide the context for relations between states.  This leads integration to be a function of 
the development of intergovernmental institutions aiding states in achieving their 
interests.   
For both institutionalists and intergovernmentalists, integration is a process 
gradually connecting states through increased interaction and cooperation based on 
rational calculation of expected payoffs.  However, for the former, the web intertwining 
the states is not merely a function of communication and cooperation but rather supported 
by the institutions created between them.  Institutions are integral and necessary for 
integration.  As these institutions develop, they become actors in their own right in the 
international system with their own interests and ability to affect states.   
Integration is a process of joining to and submission of states to international 
institutions.  The more power given to them between states, the more integrated the states 
can be considered.  As a result, political will is necessary for integration because such 
institutions cannot be created without state support.  This leads to the important question 
of, what is an institution?  “Rational choice institutionalism tends to define institutions as 
formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-
interested political actors” (Rosamond, 2000:115).  In this view, institutions tame the 
anarchy of the international community as the institutions become the system itself.  
These institutions may constrain state actions.  However, states are willing to maintain 
them because they reduce the risks of interaction through lowering interaction costs.  
While institutions play a primary role in integration, they are subject to the interests of 
the states.  As rational, self-interested, actors, states will use such institutions in order to 
pursue their own goals.   
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Liberal institutionalism differs from rational choice institutionalism as described 
above through giving institutions a more powerful role in the international system, seeing 
them as more independent from the states.  In addition, this theory strays from the notion 
of an inherently anarchic international system.  It sees international institutional 
organization, along with domestic interests and forces such as technology, as triumphant 
over anarchy through providing an international order.  Similar to rational choice 
institutionalism, liberal institutionalism acknowledges the motivation of state interests 
and sees political will as important to integration.  However, liberal institutionalism does 
not emphasize political will as strongly due to its acknowledgment of fragmented states 
and inclusion of interest groups and domestic actors as driving forces behind integration.   
The theory is optimistic about the prospects of international cooperation.  This and its 
discussion of non-state actors are key tenants linking liberal institutionalism more closely 
with its grand theory counterpart of liberalism than with realism.   
In terms of European integration, both forms of institutionalism explain the initial 
intergovernmental institutionalization seen in agreements such as the Treaty of Paris and 
the Treaties of Rome.  The theory also explains the recent push within ASEAN to 
develop formal institutions for cooperation.  However, this push occurred much later in 
the integration process than institutionalists would have expected, leaving the theory 
unable to explain the initial decades of East Asian integration.  Additionally, like 
intergovernmentalism, institutionalism cannot necessarily account for the supranational 
institutions seen such as the Commission or the ECJ as it does not account for why states 
would have an interest in developing new institutions that deprive them of further 
sovereignty.  In addition, the theory’s focus on the primacy of state interests in 
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integration does not allow for the sacrifice of national interests that has occurred, 
particularly with regard to eastern expansion movements.  However, in such a case, 
institutionalists may argue that expansion has been in the interest of state security and 
therefore worth the economic burdens associated with it.  
A theory better able to explain the eastern expansion of the EU and the security 
benefit it carries is Karl Deutsch’s theory of transactionalism.  For Deutsch, the 
international community is not necessarily anarchic as assumed by many of his 
predecessors.  Instead, he sees states as capable and willing to cooperate in order to 
establish an international order that will ensure their own interests of national security 
and stability.  Therefore, transactionalists’ view integration as the formation of a security 
community with successful integration culminating in the absence of war.  According to 
Deutsch,  
The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration…[is] a matter of mutual 
sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling,’ trust, and mutual consideration; of partial 
identification in terms of self-images and interest; of mutually successful predictions of 
behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it – in short, a matter of a 
perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and 
responsiveness in the process of decision-making. ‘Peaceful change’ could not be assured 
without this kind of relationship (Nelson and Stubb, 2003:129).  
 
Rather than the web of interactions and institutions that are integration under 
intergovernmentalism and institutionalism, it is a sense of identity and community that 
play a significant role for Deutsch.  Integration is the creation of a “we-feeling” that leads 
to a new grouping and security community among its members.  When states identify 
with each other to the extent that war among them is no longer conceivable, integration 
has been achieved.  These security communities can be either pluralistic or amalgamated, 
with the former describing communities in which states retain their legal independence 
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while the later is more integrated involving a formal merger and semblance of 
governance.   
The primary actors in transactionalism are the states forming security 
communities.  Their primary motivation is the alleviation of any security threat and in 
turn war within the community.  Therefore, political will is a key driving force behind 
integration as government action is a necessity for progress.  In addition, a “hypothesis of 
transactionalist work on integration was that a sense of community among states would 
be a function of the level of communication between states” (Rosamond, 2000:44).  
Increased interaction and communication creates mutual relevance and eventually the 
mutual trust needed to form a security community.  
Transactionalism draws from tenants from all three grand theories.  From realism, 
it gains its focus on security and state actors as well as its assumption of actor rationality.  
In contrast, Deutsch’s optimism on the prospects for cooperation and allowance for both 
intergovernmental and supranational entities suggests liberalist influence.  Finally, 
aspects of constructivism, particularly its focus on community and social interaction, can 
be found in transactionalism as the theory stresses the development of a “we-feeling” 
between states in order to promote security and cooperation.  This incorporation of 
tenants from all three grand theories discussed help make transactionalism a diverse 
midrange theory of integration. 
In terms of European integration, transactionalism is able to explain the region’s 
drive to integrate post-WWII.  With the common security threat of Germany still 
lingering, European states had interests in cooperating for their own security.  As their 
communication increased throughout the years, they eventually formed, first a pluralistic 
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and later, an amalgamated security community.  For Deutsch, European integration can 
be considered a success as it has resulted in the removal of even the threat of war within 
the region.  Any current widening, especially Eastern European expansion, could also be 
explained by transactionalism in that it is an attempt to alleviate any possible threat from 
the former soviet states.  However, transactionalism falls short in that it overlooks some 
of the key economic motivations that have driven European integration and led to 
advancements such as the European Monetary Union (EMU).  In addition, it fails to 
explain the continued political deepening of integration after the desired security and 
Deutch’s vision of integration had already been achieved.  
In terms of East Asian integration, transactionalism can explain many of the 
developments of ASEAN.  The organization was designed “to promote active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, 
social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields” (ASEAN 2010, Aims and 
Purposes) amongst a grouping of many small, relatively weak states.  Though regional 
security was not a specified goal of ASEAN, the organization set out to create a greater 
feeling of community amongst its members, which, according to Deutch, is an essential 
part to achieving a mutual peace.  In addition, it should be noted that ASEAN was created 
during the Cold War at which time its members faced potential security threats from the 
two global powers of the period as well as division and conflict among themselves.  
Transactionalism supports the idea of these states integrating in response to such potential 
conflict through the formation of a regional community.  Such a community can increase 
the “we-feeling” between states and therefore decrease their potential for war.  
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Transactionalism’s main shortcoming in terms of East Asian integration is that it ignores 
ASEAN’s primary focus on economic development in the region. 
Quite a different view of integration is presented by functionalism, a theory of 
integration and international relations most commonly associated with David Mitrany.  It 
is unique and stands out from intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, and 
transactionalism in that its less inter-state oriented.  Rather than integration being a 
function of state interactions, the theory takes a “bottom-up” approach to international 
relations.  Functionalism sees integration as a function of actors cooperating across state 
borders in order to better achieve necessary tasks.  Instead of integration being a viewed 
as an increasing web of cooperation and institutions between states, Mitrany sees it as a 
developing web of pragmatic cooperation between societies concerning low politics, such 
as basic and uncontroversial, economic and structural policies.  For functionalists, 
integration is an enmeshment of societies motivated by pragmatic interests and the hope 
of better meeting human needs.  Mitrany does not see states as unitary or even primary 
actors in the process.   
If one were to visualize a map of the world showing economic and social activities, it 
would appear as an intricate web of interests and relations crossing and re-crossing 
political divisions – not a fighting map of States and frontiers, but a map pulsating with 
the realities of everyday life.  They are the natural basis for international organizations 
(Mitrany, 1948:358-359). 
  
For him, the international community is not anarchic but rather an interconnection of 
economic and social activities relating on a human level.  State or territorial needs are not 
primary.  As a result, political will is of limited importance to functional integration. 
Functionalists view integration as a process that navigates around traditional state 
barriers.  It is a shift away from strict nation-state governance to a more pragmatic 
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societal organization that can extend to an international level.  The more practically 
enmeshed the communities of different states become, the more integrated they are 
considered.  This view differs from the previous theories discussed.  If individual states 
could be considered cells with borders and contents, intergovernmentalism would see 
integration as a process of the cells grouping together for a mutually beneficial function 
while each cell maintains its own integrity.  Institutionalism would see integration 
similarly but would place a greater importance on the bonding agents holding the cells 
together and helping them interact (intergovernmental institutions).  Functionalism 
however would view integration quite differently.  Under the same analogy, integration 
would start as a group of cells (states) grouped together.  As integration occurs, their 
contents begin to flow more freely between borders in attempts to increase function and 
output.  To functionalists, integration is not so much superceding or enhancing state 
authority as it is undermining or circumventing it in favor of technocracy.   
As functionalist actors begin to work together to achieve mutual, practical 
benefits,4 trust and desire for cooperation will build and cooperation will continue.  
Though mostly liberalist in origins through allowing for state cooperation and non-state 
actors, functionalists incorporate the realist tenants of maintained state sovereignty, 
particularly with regards to high politics (such as national security).  Functionalist 
international organizations, though important, are limited to low politics and 
intergovernmental authority, leaving state sovereignty intact. 
Functionalists do not see states as integrating past mutual practical cooperation. 
Functional organization of international activity can be achieved without the 
                                                
4 An example of such mutual efforts could include the coordination of actors in order to clean a shared river 
or lake. 
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incorporation of high politics and rigid institutions.  “The essential principle is that 
activities would be selected specifically and organized separately – each according to its 
nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the 
moment…No fixed rule is needed, and no rigid pattern is desirable” (Nelson and Stubb, 
2003:111-112).  They are opposed to any large-scale attempts at cooperation, seeing it as 
impractical and threatening to state sovereignty.  In this way, functionalists have fallen 
short in describing the integration seen in Europe.  
European cooperation such as the ECSC and other trade and production 
agreements can be explained (and possibly could have been predicted) under functionalist 
thought as they are examples of functional cooperation based on pragmatic needs.  
However, functionalism does not explain the important role of the state in the 
development of such agreements.  In addition, the theory fails to explain attempts at a 
common European foreign security policy or social policy due mainly to its dismissal of 
the influence of political will.  Both of these examples of integration step past the basic 
stages predicted by functionalism in that they create supranational entities, reducing state 
sovereignty, and involve both controversial and high politics.  While European society 
has become enmeshed on many levels, as functionalism would call for, it has done so 
with political will and interstate cooperation unexpected by the theory.  Similar political 
will and state action has also been the basis for ASEAN where integration has not been 
based on functional cooperation but rather on state communication.  Finally, Mitrany’s 
theory fails to explain the permanent and rigid institutions of the EU or the continued 
push to further formalize European relations through a European constitution.  Though 
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functionalism explained the initial European integration of low politics, it fell short once 
the region began institutionalizing and integrating high politics.   
Neofunctionalism attempts to address some of the shortcomings of functionalism 
that are apparent in terms of explaining European integration, particularly the role of the 
state and political will.  Commonly associated with Ernst Haas, it can be thought of as a 
revamping of functionalist theory in its attempts to better explain what had been seen.  
While it follows the basic premise of pragmatic, low-politics, cooperation found in 
functionalism, neofunctionalism acknowledges the potential for cooperation in one 
interest area to “spillover” into others.  This spillover leads to a buildup of cooperation 
and integration between states both spreading in interest areas and deepening in 
integration.  In other words, increased cooperation in neofunctionalism develops in a 
three-dimensional web of integration as opposed to the two-dimensional web of 
functionalism where cooperation remains a pragmatic function of solving mutual 
technical problems.  Neofunctionalism allows for integration to build on itself through 
spillover where cooperation can grow to involve more complicated concerns through the 
incorporation of high politics and international institutions.   
The inclusion of high politics, as well as neofunctionalism’s emphasis on the need 
for state actors, increases the importance of political will in the process of integration that 
had been dismissed in functionalism without neglecting domestic actors.  In addition, 
neofunctionalism strengthens functionalist positions on institutionalization as the 
spillover effect provides for the possibility of eventual supranational institutions and 
potentially even an integrated federal state as a result of continued mutually beneficial 
cooperation.  Neofunctionalism combines the web of state interaction discussed by 
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intergovernmentalists with the web of pragmatic societal interactions discussed by 
functionalists.  Integration is a bottom-up process of enmeshment and cooperation 
between states.  However, the structure of the end product of such integration or even the 
existence of one is left unclear by the theory.  
Neofunctionalism is a theory of integration primarily based on liberal assumptions 
in that it acknowledges non-state actors in international relations, particularly 
intergovernmental and supranational institutions, while still assuming actors to be 
rational.  In addition, there is an optimistic outlook on the possibility of state cooperation.  
The theory strays from liberal thought in that the primary interests are not state or 
institutionally based but rather are focused on individuals.  
By the 1960s, neofunctionalism was the predominant school of thought.  
However, its validity came into question when European integration first stagnated in the 
1970s only to rapidly leap forward in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Neither of these 
actions fit the neofunctionalist model of progressive and unidirectional integration or 
continual spillover of cooperation.  The main shortcoming of neofunctionalism is that it 
overlooks the international systemic factors that greatly contributed to the altered pace of 
integration observed.  It is an inward looking theory focused solely on regional changes.  
This leaves neofunctionalism lacking in ability to fully explain integration as 
international factors can greatly influence regional behavior. 
Though a founder of neofunctionalist thought, this stagnation of integration led 
Haas has to argue, “that the study of integration should cease to be a subject in its own 
right, and should become an aspect of the study of interdependence” (Rosamond, 
2000:94). Haas’ abandonment of integration-specific study in favor of the more global 
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theory of interdependence reflects both the rapidly changing international system in a 
globalizing world as well as the tension between international and comparative studies 
when observing the phenomenon.  The importance of geographical proximity can be 
easily taken for granted when discussing integration.  Haas saw the stagnation in 
European integration as a result of externalization where integration may “be slowed 
down by the perception of individual member-states of interdependencies beyond the 
region” (Rosamond, 2000:94).  In other words, state interaction and interdependence 
extending beyond the region could be inimical to regional integration.   
While there are many significant similarities in the premises of both 
neofunctionalism and interdependence theory including a view of non-state actors and an 
array of interconnections between such actors, interdependence is less a unidirectional 
process and more of a state of being in the international system.  Integration among states 
is considered more of a strategic reaction from its members to the current state of the 
international system.  Additionally, interdependence focuses on primarily on economic 
security and cooperation.  According to interdependence theory, 
Countries are searching for instruments to increase their economic security.  Thus, 
international economic institutions will have to be concerned…with collective economic 
security.  Broadly defined, [this] means governments’ acceptance of international 
surveillance of their domestic and foreign economic policies…international organizations 
could be used to moderate conflicts over the distribution of the gains from trade and other 
economic relations and to improve the economic security of all participants (Krause and 
Nye, 1975:331). 
 
 
Rather than the neofunctionalist view of integration as a means to achieving mutual 
pragmatic needs, interdependence sees the process as a function of economic relations 
between societies.   
Interdependence theory is not motivated by a normative stance on integration and 
gives no specific direction for the process to proceed by.  Rather, it sees interdependence 
 23 
between states as “a condition in the global political economy that might…produce a 
regional integrative response” (Rosamond, 2000:95).  Integration is merely seen as a 
group of societies responding to turbulent fields of interests and therefore may not take 
on the same form in all cases.  The phenomenon is more of a naturally driven force 
produced from international conditions than a result of intentional state cooperation.  
While this does not eliminate the importance of state action, political will does not play 
the same crucial role as it does in transactionalism or neofunctionalism. 
Complex interdependence, as discussed by Keohane and Nye, is a result of 
deepened integration under interdependence theory.  Once complex interdependence has 
occurred, the involved actors are intricately intertwined and reliant upon each other.  At 
this point, their combined interests stem past initial economic concerns into other areas of 
society.  In this way, interdependence theory allows for the widening and deepening of 
integration as it spills over into other areas of interest.  International institutions are built 
to reflect and manage such interdependence.  Separation of the actors involved is not 
likely or feasible at this stage.  However, any further deepening of integration is not 
necessarily called or accounted for by the theory.  In this, it falls short in explaining 
European integration as interdependence theory provides no prediction or explanation for 
the continued deepening of the region after economic security and complex 
interdependence had been established. 
Interdependence theory is primarily based on liberalism as shown by its tenants.  
Notably, it challenges the state-centric view of realism in a liberalist manner through its 
allowance of non-state and domestic actors.  Interdependence also challenges realist 
thought through its focus on economic rather than security-based motivations.  Finally, 
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the theory reflects liberalism in holding an optimistic outlook on the ability of 
international cooperation as a means to solving common problems. 
While interdependence theory takes a more internationally based approach to 
integration, federalism is more of a comparative approach to the phenomenon 
demonstrating how drastically different approaches to the study and interpretation of 
integration can be.  Unlike functionalism or interdependence, federalism finds 
geographical proximity and claim to territory to be essential ingredients for integration.  
Additionally, it directly contrasts interdependence through having a political, rather than 
economically based motivation.  Federalism is a theory of integration that contains 
tenants from both liberalist and constructivist thought as it allows for non-security based 
international cooperation and supra-national institutions while incorporating the 
importance of norms and societal construction.   
In terms of integration, federalism was initially an idealistic push towards creating 
a United States of Europe in order to boost the security and strength of the continent after 
the devastation of WWII.  Such a concept could be readily applied to regions throughout 
the globe, including East Asia, though ASEAN has not yet pushed for such a 
development.  There is no clear-cut version of federalism as the theory encompasses 
many different incarnations of itself.  However, prominent versions of federalism all “rest 
upon a number of similar elements: a degree of close kinship or relationship [and] a will 
to unity” (Mitrany, 1948:351).  While federalism was most influential as an integration 
theory post-WWII, it is still relevant in modern-day discussion. 
The primary focus in federalism is the integration of those states sharing similar 
norms and values in order to eventually form a regional federal system through the 
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ceding of sovereignty to a supranational government.  According to Murray Forsyth, a 
modern federalist, “Federalism is the ensemble of structures and processes whereby a 
union of states or a union of polities is created and sustained” (Nelson and Stubb, 
2003:206).  In short, the theory sees integration as culminating in the transcendence of 
the nation-state.  A new level of political organization such as a shift up to a region-state 
can be seen as the ultimate goal of federalism.  Integration would result in states (or 
“cells” as discussed earlier) permanently joining to form a new barrier around 
themselves.  The extent to which each state would maintain its original composure varies 
depending on if centralized or decentralized federalism is being observed.  In either case, 
political will is a key component to success as national governments are primary actors 
whose support is necessary for the progress towards and successful attainment of a 
federalist state. 
In terms of explaining European integration, federalism has been insufficient.  
Though the eventual creation of a United States of Europe is not unimaginable, 
particularly when observing movements towards constitutionalization and continued 
deepening of integration, a European federalist state has not yet appeared and there is no 
certainty that one will.  While the theory has not necessarily been falsified, there are 
concerns are that it calls for too rigid a framework for international relations.  For 
functionalists, this rigidity is undesirable in the international community because “of the 
limits and obstacles it places to fresh common action” (Mitrany, 1948:353).5 
                                                
5 Flexibility of action is more crucial for functionalists as they are concerned with human need above state 
interests.  Federalists, on the other hand, would not be concerned with institutionalization and rigidity as it 
allows for a more solidified alliance and increased security for states. 
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While neofunctionalism describes integration as a process, federalism primarily 
describes it as a final product.  Monnetism, an integration theory named after Jean 
Monnet, an influential figure in European integration often referred to as the Father of 
Europe, looks to reconcile these two contrasting views.  It is an older theory of European 
integration that can be seen as a subtype of federalism in its goal of transcending the 
nation-state through an integrated international community.  Monnetism offers both a 
discussion of integration as an end product as well as the process in which states obtain it 
through including key aspects of both neofunctionalism and federalism.  With 
neofunctionalism, the theory shares an approach to integration that begins with low-
politics leading to a snowballing of international interaction and cooperation.  Likewise, 
actors are primarily states though non-state actors are acknowledged.  From federalism, 
Monnetism adopts a focus on geographical regions, societal norms, and supranational 
institutions.  In these ways, it can be seen as influenced by both liberalist and 
constructivist tenants.   
Monnetism views the international community as non-anarchic and manageable 
on a larger level.  It takes the normative stance that supranational integration is desirable.  
According to Monnet, Europe should stretch beyond the interests of individual nation 
states and adopt a method of common action.   
To establish this new method of common action, [Europe has] adapted to [its] situation 
the methods which have allowed individuals to live together in society: common rules 
which each member is committed to respect, and common institutions to watch over the 
application of these rules.  Nations have applied this method within their frontiers for 
centuries, but they have never yet been applied between them (Nelson and Stubb, 
2003:23).  
 
 
Monnet’s vision involves the ultimate goal of an organized international society of 
cooperation.  He sees this as best achieved though a federalist state while following a 
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pragmatic neofunctional approach in order to ease political actors into such integration.  
In this way, Monnet acknowledges the importance political will in international relations. 
For him, it is a necessary driving factor of integration as the process cannot progress 
without the support of national leaders as has been demonstrated throughout European 
integration.  
While Monnetism is able to explain the functionalist integration of Europe such as 
the ECSC and any increased deepening, there are a few aspects in which it falls short.  
First, as with neofunctionalism, the stagnation of integration seen in the 1970s and 1980s 
does not follow a monnetist line of thought that expects a consistent and progressive 
course towards supranationalism.  Secondly, as with federalism, a supranational 
government has not been, and may never be, achieved in Europe.  Finally, Monnetism 
says little to account for the EU’s rapid widening, particularly its recent acceptance of 
Eastern European states.  These new additions do not fit into what has been typically seen 
as the (Western) European society, which has been home to the norms and values that 
play such an important role for Monnet.  While Monnetism provides a repeatable 
template for integration, it has not been clearly followed in Europe nor does it explain the 
path ASEAN has taken in East Asia. 
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players working 
for their 
interests. 
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State/ 
Regional 
State/ 
Domestic 
Actors 
States are equal 
players. 
Decisions 
influenced by 
domestic and 
int’l interest 
groups. 
Liberalism 
State interaction 
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influenced by 
domestic need. 
Inter-
governmental 
institutions 
and interest 
groups 
Ra
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na
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e 
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na
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Regional 
States/ 
Insti-
tutions 
Institutions 
directly reflect 
and act on state 
interests. 
Realism 
Increased 
communication 
and cooperation 
between states 
facilitated by 
int’l 
institutions. 
Intergovern-
mental and 
Supranational 
Institutions 
Li
be
ra
l 
In
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Regional 
Insti-
tutions/ 
Interest 
Groups 
Institutions 
reflect state 
interests and 
develop own 
interests to act 
on. 
Liberalism 
Increased 
cooperation 
between states 
with a strong 
focus on the 
development of 
int’l institutions 
Intergovern-
mental and 
Supranational 
Institutions 
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sa
ct
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na
l-
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Regional
/ 
Inter-
national 
States 
States display 
mutual 
cooperation and 
attention in 
matters of 
communication. 
Realism/ 
Liberalism/ 
Construct-
ivism 
The elimination 
of potential 
conflict 
between states 
based on a built 
sense of 
community.  
Security 
Alliances and 
Int’l 
Institutions 
Fu
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tio
na
lis
m
 
State Domestic Actors 
Actors interact 
on shared issues 
based on 
technical 
knowledge. 
Liberalism/ 
Realism 
A web of 
cooperation 
between 
communities on 
mutual 
pragmatic, 
functional 
concerns. 
Technocratic 
Organizations 
Ne
of
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na
lis
m
 
State/ 
Regional 
States/ 
Domestic 
Actors 
States facilitate 
cooperation 
between 
domestic actors 
on mutual 
concerns. 
Liberalism 
Increasing 
cooperation 
between 
communities on 
shared concerns 
facilitated by 
states and 
institutions. 
Intergovern-
mental and 
Supranational 
Institutions 
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Theory Level of Analysis 
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Nature of 
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Actors 
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of Change 
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ations 
Economic 
actors cooperate 
based on market 
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States cooperate 
and interact 
through int’l 
institutions 
based on mutual 
need for 
economic 
security 
International 
Economic 
Institutions 
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Regional 
States/ 
Int’l 
Insti-
tutions 
States interact 
sharing norms 
allowing for 
deeper 
cooperation.  
Liberalism/ 
Construct-
ivism 
States in a 
region cede 
sovereignty to a 
shared 
supranational 
government. 
Supranational 
Institutions 
M
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m
 
State/ 
Regional 
Domestic 
Actors/ 
States 
States cooperate 
based on shared 
needs, 
developing 
common norms 
and values. 
Liberalism/ 
Construct-
ivism 
Cooperation on 
functional 
needs builds, 
leading states to 
choose to cede 
sovereignty to a 
supranational 
government. 
Intergovern-
mental and 
Supranational 
Institutions 
Table 1.  Theoretical Overview of the midrange theories on regional integration. 
Table 1 provides a brief summary of each of the midrange theories discussed in 
this section.  While the theories all provide their own insight to the process of regional 
integration, each also falls short of being able to explain the entirety of such a 
phenomenon.  The widely varied literature on integration suggests that there is little 
consensus on what integration is let alone how to achieve it.  Functionalists and 
interdependence theorists see the phenomenon as a process while others like federalists 
and transactionalists view it as an end product.  Integration is and must be both. 
Each theory discussed provides part of the integration seen in Europe thus far 
covering various motivations, actors, and actions involved.  However, none are capable 
of explaining the entirety of the phenomenon.  Without being able to provide a full 
explanation of occurrences thus far, the theories additionally find themselves lacking in 
 30 
their ability to predict the future of integration in Europe, East Asia, or any other region.  
The study of integration is lacking a comprehensive theory capable of properly 
explaining the phenomenon.  The theories in place are each capable of telling merely part 
of the story as they see the process from only one angle, missing the larger picture.  
Together, however, they can start to give a more reasonably comprehensive explanation 
with each theory bringing its own piece to the puzzle accounting for various actors and 
actions already observed.  Perhaps then, the solution to understanding integration lies in 
finding the right combination of the puzzle pieces these theories offer.  
Without an overarching inclusive theory, making predictions as well as policy 
prescriptions for regional integration is more like guess work than science.  The 
phenomenon is seen in a vague sense as increased international interaction and 
cooperation rather than a clear process and end point.  Without a comprehensive 
understanding of integration, how can we determine what makes Europe so advanced in 
the process and what can be done to explain, predict, and prescribe in terms of the 
phenomenon for East Asia and other regions around the globe?  This research is an 
attempt to combine a few of the testable aspects from the theories above in order to move 
closer to a more comprehensive understanding of integration. 
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Research Model & Hypotheses  
While theories on integration have not lead to a comprehensive explanation, they 
do provide a detailed picture of the actors and motivations involved from different 
perspectives.  Through combining existing theories, one can achieve a thorough 
understanding of the intricacy of integration and some of the necessary conditions for it 
to occur.  Many of the views on integration share similar aspects such as the formation of 
institutions, increased interaction, and a desire for security.  It is with these shared aspects 
that this paper will begin looking for causes of regional integration through developing a 
model with correlating independent variables.  The creation of a model incorporating 
these shared aspects should aid in the understanding of integration in developing a 
method to better explain and predict the phenomenon.  A model that can be applied 
uniformly to regions throughout the globe will not only illuminate the necessary 
conditions for integration but also allow for predictions on where it will likely occur.  
Additionally, a clearer understanding can provide insight for policy prescriptions to 
facilitate integration.  While an ambitious task, the hope for this paper is to gain a clearer 
understanding of the causal variables involved.  
In looking at the theories in the previous section, none were adequate to explain 
integration as a whole but each contributed to explaining a part of the process.  Perhaps 
one of the most intriguing aspects of integration highlighted by its multiple theories is 
that it is a phenomenon that does not fit easily into either comparative studies or 
international relations. Most of the theories on integration are based on comparativists’ 
perspectives and tend to miss the impact of systemic factors of international relations.  In 
contrast, the theories based on international relations’ perspectives tend to miss the state 
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and regional level developments captured in comparative politics.  Integration crosses 
equally into both disciplines needing both state level changes and changes in the 
international system in order to occur.  Therefore, a model on integration needs to be able 
to capture the impact of both state level and international systemic developments.  
Through combining elements of both international relations and comparative based 
theories, the model presented combines their differing levels of analysis by looking at 
state, regional, and systemic factors. 
It would seem logical that, in order to integrate, states would need the ability and 
incentive to do so, both of which can be affected by changes within the state and region 
as well as the international system.  As mentioned above, the theories on integration paint 
a broad picture of the phenomenon seeing it as the formation of regional institutions, 
increased interaction between both states and society, and a mutual desire for security.  In 
creating a model for integration, this research began by looking for empirically 
measurable variables to represent these three aspects of integration illuminated by its 
theories.  The variables chosen must incorporate incentive and ability for states to 
integrate impacted by both the regional and international levels through capturing 
changes in both the levels.  In order to do this, the combined variables must consider 
changes in the state and region as well as how the region is behaving in relative terms to 
the international system.  The model must represent tenants of both comparative politics 
and international relations through observing how states and regions are behaving while 
taking into consideration happenings in the international system.    
The integration model will need three independent variables, one for each aspect 
of integration discussed above.  In addition, the model must capture multiple levels of 
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analysis through observing changes at the state, regional, and global levels.  Each of these 
independent variables will be measured to see their effect on the overall level of 
integration in the regions observed.  Based on this model this paper conceptualizes 
integrations as a function of the following: 
IAS = α+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+e 
Where: 
IAS = The Integration Achievement Score for the region; 
X1 = Standard deviation of regime type within the region; 
X2 = Percent of global trade occurring within intra-regionally; and 
X3 = Percent of the region’s GDP spent on military expenditures. 
These variables incorporate the state and regional levels of analysis of comparative 
politics through looking at individual state’s development and the region as a whole.  
Additionally, international relations theory in incorporated by taking the international 
system into consideration in their measurements. 
For this model, the dependent variable is the Integration Achievement Score 
(IAS),6 which measures the level of integration within the region in economic terms 
between states and for regional organizations as a whole.  While political integration is 
important, the measurements are economically focused for two primary reasons.  First of 
all, indicators of economic integration are more universally measurable, at least at this 
time while integration is in its infancy in most parts of the world, excluding Europe.  
Secondly, the history of the EU suggests that indications of integration are first evident in 
the economic sector, though potentially driven by social and political factors, with 
                                                
6 I am extremely grateful to Dr. Genna for his generosity in sharing his most recent IAS data with me for 
the purposes of this paper. 
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political integration usually following a step or two behind.   Therefore, the use of more 
politically oriented measurements could overlook initial progress being made, especially 
in East Asia.  While, in this model, integration is considered affected by systemic factors, 
the IAS is a measurement strictly of state and regional integration levels. 
The level of integration was measured using the integration achievement score as 
composed by Dr. Gaspare Genna. IAS scores were initially available for only the states in 
Europe.  These scores have been thoroughly developed to give dyadic scores between all 
states in the region, allowing for an intricate look at European integration.  More recently, 
the IAS scores have been expanded to include data for regions throughout the globe.  
This data shows the growth of integration levels in specific regional organizations over 
time.  However, IAS data between dyads of states in the regions outside of Europe is not 
yet available.  This creates a serious problem in comparing IAS between Europe and East 
Asia.  Therefore, when observing integration levels in East Asia, this paper will be 
looking at the IAS scores for the organization of ASEAN.  For the purpose of 
consistency, European levels of integration will be viewed as the IAS scores for the 
organization of the EU.  
The data composed by Dr. Genna includes three types of integration scores; the 
Economic Integration Achievement Score (EIAS), the Political Integration Achievement 
Score (PIAS), and the overall Integration Achievement Score (IAS).  The IAS looks at all 
six factors included in the data; free movement of goods and services, free movement of 
capital, free movement of labor, supranational institutions, monetary coordination, and 
fiscal coordination.  Each factor is given a score from zero to five with five being the 
most integrated.  The IAS is the average of the scores for all six factors.  The EIAS 
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incorporates the more economically based factors; movement of goods and services, 
movement of capital, and movement of labor.  The EIAS is the average of the scores for 
these three factors.  The PIAS is an average of the scores for the more politically 
motivated factors; supranational institutions, monetary coordination, and fiscal 
coordination.  This research will take all three measurements into consideration in order 
to get a more rounded view of integration levels in these regions.   
The unit of analysis for this research will be the region with Europe and East Asia 
being observed.  For Europe, all states that are a member of the EU (referred to as the 
EU27) are included.  For East Asia, the cases include all 13 states that compose 
ASEAN+3.  In addition, where applicable, Taiwan will be considered in the data as it is a 
key economic figure in the region despite its controversial status as an independent state.  
The time span for the measurements will cover post World War II interactions.   
However, measurements for some states might begin later, particularly in East Asia, as 
political independence will be a necessary condition both due to data availability and to 
prevent any skewed data from colonized states not acting of their own accord. 
 The first independent variable presented in the model is regime type variance and 
will focus on state and regional level changes.  Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge,” (Krasner, 1983:2).  The development of international institutions 
plays a significant role in integration particularly as discussed in intergovernmentalism, 
institutionalism, and federalism. The formation of regional institutions is perhaps the 
most tangible sign of integration as the institution is a direct representation of states 
agreeing to cooperate.  However, in attempting to model integration, measuring the 
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number or intensity of regional institutions in an area would be more a way to measure 
the effect of integration, not the cause.  In searching for a causal variable, a feature that 
enables and encourages states to create the regional institutions in the first place must be 
found.   
This model will look at regime types within a region as the more similar the 
regime types are, the more feasible the creation of both intergovernmental and 
supranational institutions should be.  For example, when looking at Europe, one will find 
that all states are democracies.  Such democratization is, in fact, a requirement for 
entrance into the EU.  Without relatively similar regime types, consensus on the structure 
and creation of international institutions would be difficult for states to come to, 
particularly if such institutions are indeed a reflection of state interests as the theories 
suggest.  States would want their international institutions to reflect their own interests.  
Varying regimes between members would make complex development of these 
institutions extremely complicated as the states would be unlikely to carry similar 
interests to such an extent.  
In measuring regime type, this research will use a uniform scale between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes, observing similarities in civil liberties, government 
control on market, and democratic voting behavior.  The Polity IV 2008 data will be used 
in order to measure this uniformly in both regions between the years of 1945 to 2008.  
The focus on similarity of regime types throughout the regions is based on an expectation 
that similarity will increase ability of states to integrate.  To measure variance throughout 
the region for each year, the standard deviation from the mean will be calculated. 
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The second independent variable captures economic interaction between states.  It 
is generally assumed in integration theories (particularly functionalism, neofunctionalism, 
and interdependence) that, as economic interaction increases, states are likely to seek 
more deepening of regional integration.  This is a reciprocal effect as deepening of 
regional integration reinforces increase in economic relationships between member states.  
Economic interaction between states observes changes on a state and regional level while 
also considering systemic factors such as the state of the global economy.  The more 
states interact, the more incentive and ability they create to work together and form 
institutions to make the process run more smoothly through lowering transaction costs.   
Interaction between states can be measured in numerous ways.  This model will 
specifically measure levels of intra-regional economic interaction between states through 
external (imports and exports) trade.  Trade between states in the region as well as total 
trade with the globe will be measured for both Europe and East Asia in order to 
determine the percentage that is intra-regional.  By finding the percentage of trade that is 
intra-regional in comparison to total global trade, the measurement will take into account 
not only the direct levels of interaction between states in the regions but also the relative 
levels on an international scale.   
Using information gathered from the Direction of Trade Statistics dataset 
provided by the International Monetary Fund, the levels of intra-regional trade for Europe 
and East Asia will be observed between the years of 1980 to 2008.  Intra-regional trade is 
considered to be all imports and exports traded between nations within the specified 
region.  The expectation is that increased intra-regional trade will provide incentive for 
regional integration.  The more interaction and dependence within a region, the more 
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incentive there will be to cooperate and eventually formalize such cooperation in order to 
make it more efficient.  In addition, the more interaction, the better able states will be to 
integrate. 
The final independent variable is the presence of a security threat.  The theories 
on regional integration commonly view actors as integrating in pursuit of their interests, 
particularly the primary shared interest of state security.  This directly correlates with 
Karl Deutch’s idea of security communities in his theory of transactionalism as well as 
aspects of federalism and intergovernmentalism.  Such theories argue that the lingering 
threat of Germany was a primary incentive for European integration during post WWII as 
integration was a means of protecting the shared state interest of security in the region.  A 
similar threat in other regions of the world should provide incentive for similar actions.  
Therefore, this variable will be looking for any threat to the security within the regions 
observed. 
The presence of a security threat will be measured through states’ military 
expenditure where a rise in military expenditure would suggest a perceived increase in 
security threat.  To measure this, this research will look at the amount spent on military 
expenditure in each region.  In attempts to control for the vastly different levels of 
development and national wealth in the states being observed, military expenditure will 
also be measured as a percentage of each state’s GDP.  This will give a more relative 
view for the regions. A spike in military expenditure should suggest the presence of a 
security threat.  The data for this variable will come from two primary sources.  The 
military expenditure data will be gathered from the Correlates of War project giving 
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statistics for the dollar amount spent by each state for each year.  The GDP data will be 
gathered from the World Bank.     
A security threat may be either external or from within the region itself as an 
increase in expenditure could be due to either.  This allows for the variable to consider 
both regional and systemic factors in its observations.  The presence of a threat will be 
expected to increase integration through providing incentive for cooperation.  Its absence, 
however, will be expected to have a neutral, rather than negative, effect on integration.  
This is due to the assumption that the absence of a security threat would only represent 
the lack of a particular incentive to integrate, not any particular disincentive for or strain 
on the process. 
The model developed views regional integration as a function of the three 
variables discussed above.  All three must be in place for the process to occur and 
integration to progress.  Each independent variable is expected to interact with the 
dependent variable in a specific manner.  The specific expectations and hypotheses for 
each variable are discussed below. 
 
Hypotheses 
From the variables stemming from integration theories discussed above, similar 
regime types, increased economic interaction, and the presence of a security threat to the 
region are expected to have a causal relationship with increased levels of regional 
integration.  Therefore the testable hypothesis for this paper is three-part:   
H1.  A lower standard deviation between the Polity IV rankings of the states in a 
region will lead to a higher integration achievement score. 
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H2.  A higher percentage of intra-regional trade observed will lead to an 
increased integration achievement score in the region. 
H3.  An increase in military expenditure will lead to a higher integration 
achievement score in the region. 
All three hypotheses work together and are necessary suggesting the dependent variable 
of integration to have multiple causes.  Similarity of regime type, increased economic 
interaction, and the presence of a security threat will lead to increased integration 
amongst states in a region.  To test these hypotheses, this research will look at both 
Europe as East Asia and then compare the results of the two regions to see if they are 
consistent with both the theory and each other. 
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Findings 
 This section provides an overview of the data gathered on each variable in the 
aforementioned equation for both Europe and East Asia.  The data for each variable will 
first be presented individually.  This will be followed by a discussion of their behavior 
with one another in the model presented.   
 
Levels of Integration 
 Figure 1 is a chart showing the three integration achievement scores for the EU 
from 1952 to 2004.  The IAS begins with a score of one for the organization meaning the 
EU demonstrated a degree of regional integration from its conception.  All three 
integration scores show a steady increase over the time span with the EIAS leading the 
way until all three scores merge at 3.67 in 2002.   
 
Figure 1.  Integration Achievement Scores for the EU from 1952-2004.  Data Source: Gaspare Genna 
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 Figure 2 shows the integration achievement scores for ASEAN from 1968 to 
2004.  The scores in East Asia are much lower than those found in Europe ending at a 
lower integration level in 2004 than the EU began with.  Additionally, East Asian 
integration levels remain at zero even after the formation of ASEAN, not increasing until 
1977; a decade after the organization was created.  The three scores for the region remain 
almost completely consistent with each other for the first 24 years.  However, when there 
is variance among them, the EIAS is again the leading score, especially in the last decade.  
 
Figure 2.  Integration Achievement Scores for ASEAN from 1968-2004. Numbers include the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement beginning in 1992. Data Source: Gaspare Genna. 
 
These integration scores demonstrate that the EU is significantly more advanced 
than ASEAN in terms of integration levels.  In the time span observed, both organizations 
show a gradual increase in their levels of integration with both regions also 
demonstrating the tendency to increase their EIAS prior to their PIAS.  In Europe, the 
creation of an institution, the EU, coincided with instant levels of integration for the 
region.  This is to be expected as the institution was designed to increase integration and 
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cooperation amongst its member states.  In contrast, from its conception ASEAN has 
been viewed more as forum for communication amongst its members than an effort to 
integrate them.  As the integration scores demonstrate, the organization had virtually no 
hold over its members initially as it provided no increase in integration levels for its first 
decade.  Even as ASEAN’s IAS increases, it still has a significantly lesser impact on the 
region’s integration levels when compared to the EU. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
IAS 53 1 
3.666666667 2.443396226 0.71383115 
EIAS 53 
1.333333333 3.666666667 2.899371069 0.658880512 
EU 
PIAS 53 
0.666666667 3.666666667 1.987421384 0.821615732 
IAS 36 0 
0.666666667 0.337962963 0.223557496 
EIAS 36 0 1 
0.425925926 0.33438986 
ASEAN 
PIAS 36 0 
0.333333333 0.25 0.146385011 
Valid N (listwise) 36     
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for Integration Achievement Scores. 
 Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the integration scores in both Europe 
and East Asia.  The statistics given echo the data observed in the charts with the EU 
showing a higher average as well as higher minimum and maximum IAS than ASEAN.  
Additionally, both regions show highest averages for the EIAS as well as increased 
scores for all three measurements over the time span.  This growth is greater both in 
overall quantity and proportionality in the EU than in ASEAN.  The IAS data 
demonstrates what was expected; Europe is more integrated than East Asia. 
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Regime Type  
The IAS shown above demonstrates that East Asia is not as integrated as Europe.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis would expect to find more consistency in regime types in 
Europe and more diversity in East Asia.  Figure 3 displays the results of the Polity IV 
scores for all 27 members of the current EU for these years.  Data was not available for 
states of Malta and Luxembourg. 
 
Figure 3.  Polity scores for all EU27 members from 1945-2008.  Malta and Luxembourg are not included.  
Data source: Polity IV 
 
 As Figure 3 demonstrates, there was a significant amount of regime type diversity 
among the EU27 until 1989 when all members scored between a five and a ten on the 
scale.  The diversity lessened even further by the turn of the century and has remained 
there since with all members scoring between an eight and a ten.  Polity IV classifies 
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states scoring a six or higher as a democracy.  Under this classification, all EU27 
members were democracies by 1996. 
 Figure 4 shows the Polity IV scores for the members of the EU when membership 
is controlled for.  No scores are displayed for states before they joined the union.  With 
this control added, there diversity in regime types in the region drastically declines. 
 
Figure 4.  Polity scores for all members of the EU as it developed from 1951-2008.  Malta and Luxembourg 
are not included.  Data source: Polity IV 
  
 With the exception of France between 1958-1968, the polity scores for members 
of the EU remain between eight and ten demonstrating both a high level of democracy 
and similarity.  With regard to the decade long dip in the French score, it is important to 
note that it occurred after France had been a member for seven years.  Additionally, the 
French decreased polity score also occurred after the Treaty of Rome was signed and 
coincided with the slowed pace of integration in the region at the time.  
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 Figure 5 displays the same measurement when applied to the region of East Asia, 
specifically the current member states of ASEAN+3 and Taiwan.  Data was not available 
for the state of Brunei.  Though Figure 3 showed a significant amount of diversity in 
Europe over the same time span, the variance of regime types found in East Asia would 
appear to be much greater. 
 
Figure 5.  Polity scores for all members of ASEAN+3 and Taiwan from 1945-2008 excluding Brunei.  Data 
source: Polity IV 
 
 The range of scores shown for Europe in Figure 3 start at a difference of 19, drop 
down to a difference of five by 1989 and settle at a difference of two by 2000.  In 
contrast, while East Asia begins with a similar range of scores, such a range is relatively 
maintained throughout the time period observed.  Though the overall trend of the member 
states has shown a slight democratization in the region, there is still a range of 18 among 
the polity scores shown by 2008.   
 Figure 6 adds the control of membership to ASEAN+3 to the polity 
measurements with no scores being reported for members prior to their addition.  In 
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contrast to Europe, the range of scores is unaffected by the control of membership to the 
regional organization.  While, again, a slight trend towards regional democratization can 
be seen, the overall variance of regime types is significantly greater within ASEAN+3 
than the EU with a range of 18 by 2008.   
 
Figure 6.  Polity scores for ASEAN+3 members as added excluding Brunei from 1967-2008.  Data source: 
Polity IV 
 
 As ASEAN+3 comprises of less binding agreements than ASEAN itself, Figure 7 
observes the polity scores of the organization without the +3 states of Japan, China, and 
South Korea.  While there is little effect on the range of regime types, the difference in 
scores does drop by two points down to 16 by 2008.  There is also a decrease in overall 
democratization with the subtraction of the developed democracies of South Korea and 
Japan. 
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Figure 7. Polity scores for ASEAN members as added excluding Brunei from 1967-2008.  Data source: 
Polity IV 
 
 The final observations made on regime types in the regions focus on overall 
classification rather than specific scores of member states.  Polity IV categorizes states 
with a polity score from -10 to -6 as autocracies, those with scores from -5 to 5 as 
anocracies, and those scoring between 6 and 10 as democracies.  Figure 8 shows the 
categories of regime types as found in Europe between 1945-2008 as a percentage of the 
overall region. While Europe is initially diverse in regime types, it remains 
predominantly democratic throughout the time period.  Additionally, by 1997, the region 
is 100% comprised of democracies. 
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Figure 8. Regime type distribution in Europe by percentage, 1945-2008. Data source: Polity IV 
 
 Figure 9 shows the same measurement but controls for membership to the EU, 
excluding all data for states prior to their addition.  With the addition of this control, the 
regime types in the region become almost entirely uniform with the exception of France 
being classified as an anocracy from 1958-1968.  Aside from this, the members of the EU 
are consistently classified as democracies. 
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Figure 9. Regime types of EU members by percentage from 1951-2008. Data source: Polity IV 
 
 In contrast to Europe, East Asia displays a great deal more diversity in its regime 
types.  Additionally, there is no consistent dominant regime type such as democracies in 
Europe.  Rather, each regime category takes a turn at being the most prominent in the 
region over the time span observed.   
 
Figure 10.  Regime type distribution in East Asia, 1945-2008.  Data source: Polity IV 
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 When the control for membership to ASEAN+3 is added to the data, there is still 
a significant amount of diversity in the region, particularly compared to Europe.  When 
membership to ASEAN+3 is considered, there is actually more diversity in regime types 
with each category consisting of approximately one third of the membership in 1996 and 
2007. 
 
Figure 11. Regime types of ASEAN+3 by percentage, 1967-2008. Data source: Polity IV 
 
 When the same membership control is given for just the members of ASEAN, the 
numbers from 1997 onward show an even greater variance in regime types.  When the +3 
are subtracted, ASEAN consists of one third autocracy, anocracy, and democracy for all 
but 4 years between 1995 and 2008.  
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Figure 12. Regime types of ASEAN by percentage, 1967-2008. Data source: Polity IV 
 
 While the data shown above gives an overall picture of what the regime types 
look like in the two regions and shows us that East Asia appears to be much more diverse 
as expected, a measurement is needed that demonstrates exactly how varied the regimes 
are in a region in any given year.  Above, the range of scores found in each region is 
discussed.  While a range can offer a general idea of variance by showing the outer limits 
of the scores, the standard deviation from the mean for the regime types in each region 
gives a more precise measurement of their variance over the time span observed.  Figure 
13 shows the standard deviation of regime types in Europe and East Asia as well as 
standard deviation specifically within the EU, ASEAN, and ASEAN+3.  
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Figure 13. Standard deviations of regime types, 1945-2008.  Europe does not include Malta or 
Luxembourg.  East Asia includes all members of ASEAN+3 as well as Taiwan. 
 
 Europe as a region shows the highest standard deviation but drops rapidly at the 
end of the Cold War, almost a full six points between 1988 and 1990.  In contrast, the 
standard deviation shown for the EU is very low remaining at zero until 1958 with the 
ten-year drop in the French polity score under De Gaulle.  Other than the increased 
deviation during this period, the standard deviation for the EU regime types stays below 
one for the time span observed.  The numbers for Europe and the EU merge in 2007 
when the final two members of the EU27 gained membership.   
The standard deviation of regime types in East Asia is actually lower than Europe 
until 1989.  While East Asia shows a great deal of variance in regime type, Europe was 
drastically polarized up to this time due to the Cold War.  This polarization raised the 
standard deviation from the mean more than the variety found in East Asia.  Over the 
time observed no decrease is shown in the standard deviation for the region.  When 
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looking at the numbers for ASEAN and ASEAN+3, they show a slightly lower standard 
deviation in regime types than the region as a whole with the numbers for ASEAN and 
ASEAN+3 being identical up until 1997 when the +3 were added.  After 1997, 
ASEAN+3’s numbers rise while ASEAN’s begin to slowly drop.  
 The data shown for Europe behaves somewhat as expected with the EU showing 
low levels of standard deviation in its regime types and the deviations for the region 
overall lowering as time passes and the region becomes more integrated.  However, 
Europe’s numbers behave unexpectedly in having such a high standard deviation up until 
1989, higher than found for East Asia the less integrated region.  East Asia behaves as 
expected through having a high standard deviation for the time span observed.  
Additionally, ASEAN and ASEAN+3 show higher numbers than the EU, which follows 
as expected with their integration scores.  ASEAN+3 also behaves as expected with a 
higher standard deviation than ASEAN, consistent with it being less integrated.  Where 
East Asia does not behave as expected is that it does not show a general downward trend 
in its regime type variation over the time span despite it gradually becoming more 
integrated. 
 Below, Table 3 gives the overall descriptive statistics for the standard deviation in 
both regions.  The numbers given are specifically for the standard deviation of each 
regional organization so as to be compatible with the IAS.  As the graph above 
demonstrates, the control for membership in these organizations drastically affects the 
deviation in regime types found.  The effect of this will be discussed later on in this 
paper.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
StDev of 
Regime Type for 
ASEAN 
42 3.834057902536E0 7.529940238807E0 5.90818798709095E0 .919223173633749 
StDev of 
Regime Type for 
EU 
58 0 2 .80 .753 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
42     
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics for the standard deviation of regime type in the EU and ASEAN. 
 
 Table 3 shows that the standard deviation of regime types in ASEAN is higher in 
its minimum, maximum, and mean than the EU.  Overall, the data observed on regime 
types in the two regions demonstrates that Europe has less variance but more polarization 
in its regimes during the Cold War and trends towards uniformity and democratization 
over the period observed.  In contrast, East Asia has a vastly diverse set of regime types 
and maintains its variance throughout the time span observed.  With the control for 
membership in the regional organizations of the EU and ASEAN, the EU is much more 
similar in regime types than ASEAN as expected in the hypothesis with its higher 
integration levels.  However, up until 1989, the view of the region as a whole tells a 
somewhat different story with Europe having a significantly higher standard deviation 
than East Asia due to its extreme polarization, contrary to the expectations of the 
hypothesis. 
 
Intra-Regional Trade 
 
In looking at economic interaction in both Europe and East Asia, the second 
hypothesis above would expect to find a greater amount of trade among European states 
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than in East Asia as the latter has a lower IAS than Europe.  Additionally, gradual 
increases of intra-regional trade in both regions over the time observed are expected as 
their IAS score increased.  Figure 14 displays the amount of imports, exports, and total 
trade between the EU27 members as a percentage of the total goods traded by the EU27 
to the world. 
Figure 14. Percent of total trade occurring within the EU27 members, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 The data in Figure 14 includes all 27 current members of the EU.  However, 
measurements for East Germany prior to its reunification with West Germany and 
Czechoslovakia prior to its split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia are not included.  
The data shows that, since 1980, Europe has seen a gradual increase in overall intra-
regional trade.  This is consistent with the expectations of the hypothesis as it correlates 
with the region’s gradually increased levels of integration.  Levels of intra-regional 
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imports for Europe have remained consistently, though not drastically lower than intra-
regional exports.  
 Figure 15 shows the same measurements when applied to the members of 
ASEAN.  There is a notable difference between ASEAN and the EU27 data shown 
above, primarily that there is a significantly lower overall percentage of intra-regional 
found amongst the states of ASEAN.  This is again consistent with the hypothesis as East 
Asia would be expected to show a lower level of economic interaction than Europe. 
 
Figure 15. Percent of total trade occurring within ASEAN members, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 
 Figures 16 and 17 below display the levels of trade between the states in 
ASEAN+3 with figure 17 taking Hong Kong and Macau into consideration.  The addition 
of the +3 members (Japan, South Korea, and mainland China) significantly increases the 
levels of trade within the region by over 10%.  A similar increase is seen with the 
inclusion of Hong Kong and Macau in the measurements.  This would appear to be 
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contrary to the hypothesis that would expect to see the highest levels of intra-regional 
trade between the members of ASEAN, the most integrated group, and the lowest levels 
with the inclusion of Hong Kong and Macau, the most loosely associated members in the 
regional organization.   
 
Figure 16. Percent of total trade occurring within ASEAN+3 members, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
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Figure 17. Percent of total trade occurring within ASEAN+3 members including Hong Kong and Macau, 
1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 
 Figure 18 provides a comparison between Europe and East Asia with the latter 
being presented in the three groupings discussed above.  A direct comparison between the 
regions supports the hypothesis of a higher level of economic interaction amongst more 
integrated states as Europe shows a significantly higher level of intra-regional trade as 
expected.  In addition, all measurements show a steady increase in regional economic 
interaction in the 28 years observed.  This is consistent with the hypothesis in that both 
Europe and East Asia have been continuing to integrate.  However, the break down of the 
East Asian organizations is contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis with the lesser-
integrated groups showing a higher level of intra-regional trade.   
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Figure 18. Percent of total trade in Europe and East Asia, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 The unexpected results in East Asia led to curiosity on the effect of the removing 
the United States from the total global trade of the regions.  With the US being a globally 
dominant economic power for the time span observed as well as having a particularly 
high level of trade with many East Asian states, removing the US from the measurements 
could drastically alter the percentage of intra-regional trade.  Figure 19 shows the 
percentage of intra-regional trade for Europe and East Asia in the same groupings as 
found in Figure 18.  However, all trade with the US has been removed from the equation.  
While the percentages for all groups measured increased, they did so at similar rates 
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keeping them in almost identical relative position to one another giving similar response 
for the hypothesis. 
 
Figure 19. Percent of total trade minus the US for Europe and East Asia, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 
 All the data presented above is for member-states in the region for the entire time 
span.  While it offers an insight into the economic interaction within each region, it does 
not control for membership in the regional organizations of the EU and ASEAN as is 
necessary for compatibility with the IAS data.  Figure 20 presents the levels of intra-
regional trade within the organizations of the EU and ASEAN, including only trade data 
for states after they have become members.  The numbers both with and without US trade 
are included. 
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Figure 20. Percent of total trade within the EU and ASEAN, 1980-2008. Data Source: IMF 
 
 The levels of trade for both the EU and ASEAN are similar though slightly lower 
than those for their respective regions as a whole.  Both organizations behave as expected 
by the hypothesis with the EU showing significantly higher levels of intra-regional trade 
than ASEAN.  Additionally, they both show a gradual increase in intra-regional trade 
over the time span observed, which is consistent with their integration scores. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
% Intra-EU 29 4.905231703988E1 6.593905659515E1 5.81102222434642E1 4.950825172319340E0 
% Intra-
ASEAN 
29 1.500100551128E1 2.501069024114E1 1.99622056429195E1 3.278958258137006E0 
% Intra-EU 
US Control 
29 5.309138293973E1 7.034256916747E1 6.28240611160724E1 5.027646169758024E0 
% Intra-
ASEAN 
US Control 
29 1.779993677056E1 2.852303769170E1 2.37301057936118E1 3.440288161294996E0 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
29     
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for intra-regional trade in the EU and ASEAN. 
  
Table 4 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for the trade data 
presented for both the EU and ASEAN.  These statistics show that the EU has a higher 
minimum, maximum, and mean than ASEAN for its percentage of intra-regional trade 
from 1980-2008.  In general, the trade data observed for the two regions behaved as 
expected by the hypothesis.  Both Europe and East Asia show an increased level of intra-
regional trade over time, consistent with their increased IAS.  Additionally, Europe 
showed higher levels of intra-regional trade than East Asia, also consistent with their 
respective IAS levels.   
Unlike the measurements for regime type similarity, controlling for membership 
in the regional organizations of the EU and ASEAN had little effect on the behavior of 
the trade data.  The measurements did alter the findings slightly by lowing the overall 
percentages for each region but did not alter the relationship between them or their 
gradual increases in intra-regional trade over time.  The only finding that was contrary to 
the expectations of the hypothesis came from within East Asia.  The relationship between 
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ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN+3+Hong Kong and Macau is the inverse of what was 
expected with the least integrated grouping showing the highest level of trade and vice 
versa.  More country specific data would perhaps present an explanation for this finding 
and is something to be observed in future research. 
 
Security Threat 
The third hypothesis expects to see a spike in military expenditure around the 
time or slightly prior to a rise in integration levels.  Figure 21 displays the amount in 
current US dollars that each of the EU27 states spent on military expenditures from 1945 
to 2001.  All figures are measured in current US dollars. 
 
Figure 21.  Military expenditures for European states, 1945-2001. Data Source: Correlates of War. 
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 While most of the states in Europe spent under $10,000,000,000 and showed a 
slow, gradual rise in expenditure, there are a few notable outliers.  France, Germany, East 
Germany, the UK, and Italy all show proportionately more drastic increases in their 
military expenditure.  In addition, Poland shows a spike in expenditures in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  However, when the numbers are converted to a percentage of each 
state’s GDP, the results are drastically different. 
 
Figure 22.  Military expenditures for European states as percent of their GDP, 1960-2001. Data Sources: 
Correlates of War and World Bank. 
 
 Figure 22 shows the military expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the EU27 
from 1960 to 2001.  Those states that appeared to spike in their expenditures in Figure 21 
are actually among the lower spenders in terms of percentages.  In contrast, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, and Cyprus are among the big spenders each showing notable spikes in 
their military expenditures.  
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Figure 23.  Military expenditures for East Asian states, 1945-2001. Data Source: Correlates of War. 
 
 Figure 23 above shows the military expenditure for all East Asian states from 
1945 to 2001.  China and Japan prove to be clear in the leaders in the region in terms of 
overall military expenditure for most of this time period with South Korea and Taiwan 
also spending notable amounts.  Thailand remains a comparably low spender though it 
demonstrates a significant spike in military expenditures between 2000 and 2001.  When 
looking at the percentages presented below in Figure 24 showing military expenditure in 
the region’s state as related to their GDPs, one can see periodic spikes in Cambodia and 
Vietnam.  Additionally, the data shows that China was clearly well above the rest of the 
region in its relative expenditures up until the mid-1980s and going up again after 2000.  
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Figure 24.  Military expenditures for East Asian states as percent of their GDP, 1960-2001. Data Sources: 
Correlates of War and World Bank. 
  
In order to get a better picture of the military expenditures in both Europe and 
East Asia in their entirety, the figures for each region’s states were added together to 
create a regional total.  Figure 25 shows the total dollar amount spent on military 
expenditure in both Europe and East Asia from 1945 to 2001.  Both regions see an 
overall increase in spending with Europe spending significantly more as would be 
expected due to their larger economies.   
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Figure 25.  Total military expenditure per region.  Data Source: Correlates of War 
 
 Figure 26 shows the overall military expenditure for each region as a percentage 
of the region’s total GDP.  Both Europe and East Asia demonstrate a gradual decrease in 
the relative military expenditures over the time observed.  While Europe shows a fairly 
smooth decrease, there are the occasional spikes in expenditure for East Asia.  The first 
spike occurs in 1962, five years prior to the official formation of ASEAN in 1967.  
However, this is not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis as, while ASEAN was 
formed shortly after, integration scores for the region remain at zero until 1977.  Military 
expenditures spike again in East Asia in 1996.  This spike occurs only a year prior to the 
1997 addition of the +3 members as well as Myanmar and Laos.  Additionally, and in 
support of the hypothesis, this 1996 spike in expenditure also happens shortly prior to the 
1999 rise in the region’s integration scores. 
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Figure 26.  Total military expenditure as percent of GDP per region.  Data Sources: Correlates of War and 
World Bank. 
 
 Unlike East Asia, Europe does not show any notable spikes in military 
expenditure in the time observed offering no support for the hypothesis as its integration 
scores continued to rise.  However, for Europe in particular, data back into the late 1940s 
early 1950s would potentially tell a different story as it would show any potential security 
threats during the time of the EU’s formation.  By 1960 when this particular dataset 
begins, the EU had already been initiated and Europe was showing notable levels of 
integration. 
 As with the other two independent variables, military expenditure must be 
observed in terms of each region’s organizations in order to be directly compatible with 
the IAS scores previously shown.  Figures 27 and 28 show the total amount spent on 
military expenditure by the EU and ASEAN as well as the amount as a percentage of the 
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total GDP.  No numbers are reported for any states prior to their joining their respective 
regional organizations. 
 
Figure 27.  Total military expenditure per regional organization.  Data Sources: Correlates of War. 
 
 With the control for membership, the totals for Europe are slightly lowered 
whereas East Asia’s are drastically lowered having lost larger economies of the +3 states.  
In this, the members of the EU can be seen as spending significantly more on military 
expenditures than those of ASEAN.  When looking at expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, Europe’s numbers again remain relatively similar.  Similarly, East Asia again 
shows significantly lower numbers through losing the data from states with high 
percentages in expenditure such as China (a member of the +3) and Cambodia (who did 
not become a member until 1999).  Both regions show similar percentages for military 
expenditure with no notable spikes in spending except for one in East Asia in 2001 that 
correlates with the spike in Thailand’s expenditures.  These findings are not supportive of 
the hypothesis as no spikes in military expenditures for EU or ASEAN correlate with 
their rising integration levels. 
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Figure 28.  Total military expenditure as percent of GDP per regional organization.  Data Sources: 
Correlates of War and World Bank. 
 
 Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the military expenditure as percent of 
GDP for both the EU and ASEAN.  While these descriptive stats are not able to show 
spikes in expenditure, they do show that, on average, the two organizations spend similar 
levels of their GDP on military expenditures.  Additionally, the two regions have similar 
ranges in expenditures though ASEAN spends slightly more. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EU Military 
Exp. as %GDP 
42 1.841983713784E0 4.611945284466E0 3.07368365664756E0 .775770427377203 
ASEAN Military 
Exp. as %GDP 
35 2.384673082860E0 5.373065620940E0 3.14215261893400E0 .625437767714383 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
35     
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics for military expenditure as percent of GDP. 
 Overall, the data presented for military expenditure in both regions was not 
directly supportive of the hypothesis.  Neither region demonstrated drastic spikes in 
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expenditure prior or during increases of their IAS scores.  The 1996 spike in military 
expenditure for the entire region of East Asia was the only notable spike to coincide with 
an increase in the region’s IAS.  What was observed instead was a steady decrease in the 
regions’ overall military expenditure. 
 
Regression Model Results 
 To analyze the data presented above, a multiple regression was run with all three 
independent variables against each version of the dependent variable.  For this, the data 
for all three independent variables and the dependent variable was gathered.  
Unfortunately, due to data availability issues, the data for all variables was only available 
for the years 1980 to 2001, giving the model a total N of 44, which is less than ideal for 
such a calculation.  A multiple regression with the three independent variables was run 
for each version of the dependent (IAS, EIAS, and PIAS).  For the second independent 
variable, intra-regional trade, the data that included trade with the US was used as it is a 
more appropriate version to measure intra-regional trade as a percentage of total global 
trade.  Below are the results for the three regressions, starting with the IAS data as the 
dependent variable. 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .986a .972 .970 .223004035504875 
a. Predictors: (Constant), % Intra-Reg Trade, MilEx, StDev_Reg_Type 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.098 .470  -.208 .836 
StDev_Reg_Type -.063 .043 -.142 -1.468 .150 
MilEx -.038 .058 -.020 -.660 .513 
1 
% Intra-Reg Trade .056 .007 .840 8.315 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: IAS 
Table 6. Regression Model: IAS 
 
 Table 6 shows that intra-regional trade is the only variable found to be significant 
in the model when run against IAS as the dependent variable.  However, the R square for 
the model is .97.  This number is too high and could either be a result of the small N or 
suggestive of an issue of colinearity.  Despite this finding, the model was still run against 
the EIAS and PIAS in order to determine if they showed any significant differences.  
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .984a .968 .966 .264 
a. Predictors: (Constant), % Intra-Reg Trade, MilEx, StDev_Reg_Type 
                                              Coefficientsa  
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -.821 .555  -1.478 .147 
StDev_Reg_Type -.001 .051 -.003 -.026 .980 
MilEx .007 .069 .003 .099 .922 
1 
% Intra-Reg Trade .072 .008 .983 9.132 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: EIAS 
Table 7. Regression Model: EIAS 
 
 With the model run against the EIAS in Table 7, again, only intra-regional trade 
was determined to be significant.  The other two independent variables became even less 
significant.  Additionally, the R square proved again to be too high at .96 either due to 
colinearity, the small N, or both.  The final regression was against the PIAS as the 
dependent variable and is shown below in Table 8.  In this regression, both the standard 
deviation of regime type and the level of intra-regional trade are shown as significant.  
While it is encouraging to see deviation in regime type reported as significant, 
particularly in terms of political integration levels, the findings cannot be heavily relied 
upon as, again, the R square is too high for reliability at .96.   
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .982a .965 .962 .2245059434041
86 
a. Predictors: (Constant), % Intra-Reg Trade, MilEx, StDev_Reg_Type  
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .626 .473  1.323 .193 
StDev_Reg_Type -.125 .043 -.313 -2.886 .006 
MilEx -.083 .058 -.050 -1.426 .162 
1 
% Intra-Reg Trade .039 .007 .656 5.792 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: PIAS 
Table 8. Regression Model: PIAS 
 
 Due to the drastically high R square levels found in the regressions above, 
correlations for each variable were analyzed in order get a better idea of how the 
variables were interacting with each other.  Below in Table 9 are the correlations between 
each variable used in the model above for the years 1980 to 2001.  This shows both a 
problem of colinearity between the standard deviation of regime types and the intra-
regional trade as well as a covariate issue between the same two independent variables 
and all three dependent variables (IAS, EIAS, and PIAS).  This is most likely the cause of 
the extremely high R square levels found in the regressions.   
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 StDev_Reg_Type MilEx 
% Intra-
Reg Trade 
IAS EIAS PIAS 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .362* -.958** -.954** -.943** -.959** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .016 .000 .000 .000 .000 
StDev of 
Regime 
Type 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.362* 1 -.452** -.452** -.442** -.459** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016  .002 .002 .003 .002 
Military 
Expenditure 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.958** -.452** 1 .985** .984** .978** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002  .000 .000 .000 
% Intra-
Regional 
Trade 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.954** -.452** .985** 1 .997** .995** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .000  .000 .000 
IAS 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.943** -.442** .984** .997** 1 .985** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .000 .000  .000 
EIAS 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.959** -.459** .978** .995** .985** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .000 .000 .000  
PIAS 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 9. Model Correlations 
 
 While these correlations point out serious issues for running the regressions 
necessary to measure causality, they also allow for a clearer picture of how the variables 
interact with one another.  Below in Table 10 is the expanded version of the correlations 
between each variable.  This is different slightly from the numbers given in Table 9 in 
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that it includes both measurements for trade by including numbers with the US control.  It 
also has an expanded N for variables when available in order to give the broadest view of 
the data possible. 
 IAS EIAS PIAS 
Pearson Correlation -.839** -.844** -.802** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 StDev Regime Type 
N 
90 90 90 
Pearson Correlation .985** .985** .970** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 % Intra-Regional Trade 
N 
50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation .985** .986** .970** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 % Intra-Regional 
Trade, US Control N 
50 50 50 
Pearson Correlation -.257* -.182 -.350** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.025 .115 .002 Military Expenditure 
N 
76 76 76 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 10. Expanded Correlations. 
 The correlations in Table 10 tell an interesting story about the variables’ 
interaction with each other.  Though causality cannot yet be determined, the movement of 
the variables can be considered in terms of the three hypotheses offered.  As the table 
shows, the first independent variable, standard deviation of regime type, shows a large 
negative correlation with all three IAS measurements of around -0.8.  This is compatible 
with the expectation that as the regime types become more similar (the standard deviation 
is lowered) integration levels should increase.   
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 The second independent variable of intra-regional trade also behaves in a 
compatible way with its hypothesis.  Both the full measurement for percentage of intra-
regional trade as well as the measurement controlling for the US are highly positively 
correlated with all three IAS measurements nearing an almost one to one correlation.  
Intra-regional trade levels and IAS levels rise at nearly identical rates in a compatible 
manner with the expectation of the hypothesis.  However, for both the regime type and 
the trade levels, such high levels of correlation with the IAS measurements poses the 
question of which, if either is a causal variable.  Perhaps both are or perhaps the IAS 
scores are actually the causal variables, not dependent.  Such high correlation makes it 
difficult to distinguish. 
 The final variable of military expenditure behaves quite differently from the first 
two in terms of correlations.  With the overall IAS score, military expenditure shows a 
statistically significant, yet not drastic, negative correlation.  It shows a slightly larger 
negative correlation with the PIAS scores.  However, there is not a significant correlation 
between military expenditure and the EIAS scores.  These numbers suggest that, as 
military expenditure decreases, IAS levels will show an increase.  This does not directly 
speak to the hypothesis and therefore does not support it.  However, it does provide in 
insight to the relationship between the variables that should be further analyzed in future 
work. 
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Conclusions 
 Regional integration is a complex phenomenon that has yet to be summarized in 
either a single theory or a single model.  While further research is clearly needed, this 
paper offers some valid insights into the workings of regional integration, in particular 
how the phenomenon relates to the three independent variables presented.  The data 
presented here will hopefully provide a stepping-stone into determining the causal 
variables behind integration. 
The findings for the first variable observed, regime type similarity, are compatible 
with the first hypothesis as they show a negative correlation with integration levels.  As 
the deviation in regime types decline, integration levels increase.  Unfortunately, the high 
level of correlation between the two variables makes determining causality impossible 
without further research.  For future research, I intend to also measure levels of 
democratization throughout the regions to see what relationship this has with integration 
scores.   
The findings for the second variable observed, level of intra-regional trade, faced 
similar issues as the first.  The trade levels also behaved in a compatible manner for the 
hypothesis through showing high levels of positive correlation with the IAS 
measurements.  As trade levels increased so did integration levels.  However, as with the 
regime type measurements, the correlation was too high to be able to determine causality.  
Extending the observations prior to 1980 in future research will likely present a more 
comprehensive picture of the variables’ interactions. 
Finally, the findings for the third variable, military expenditure, did not provide 
support or concrete answers for the hypothesis.  Instead, they showed a significantly valid 
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negative correlation between regional military expenditure levels and integration scores.  
Complications with the first two variables prevented a proper regression from being run 
to determine military expenditure’s effect on integration.  However, the correlations 
demonstrated that there is a significant relationship between the two variables suggesting 
that military expenditure is a variable that should be considered in future research 
regarding regional integration.   
All three variables observed in this paper demonstrate a relationship with the IAS 
data presented.  The initial intent of this research was to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the variables for the entirety of the regions of Europe and East Asia.  
However, due to data constrictions, particularly in East Asia with regard to integration 
scores, the model presented could only be run for the actual organizations of the EU and 
ASEAN.  This had the effect of both biasing the data in favor of integration by only 
presenting states that have joined a regional organization.  Additionally, it drastically 
lowered the N for the study through preventing dyadic measurements for both regions.  
For future research, I intend to use or create dyadic data for integration levels 
between the states of East Asia as well as Europe.  This should have two effects on the 
data.  First it will reduce the issue of selection bias by examining each region in its 
entirety rather than only their organizations as they develop.  Secondly, it will drastically 
increase the N available for regressions by looking at each country dyad rather than just 
each region as a whole.  This future expansion of the data will better allow us to 
determine causality and provide us with an increased understanding of regional 
integration necessary in order to better explain and predict the phenomenon.  
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The independent variables in this research are each related to aspects of the 
existing theories on integration as discussed in the presentation of the research model.  
Table 11 below provides a basic outline to which of these theories best support the 
conclusions found for each independent variable.  For example, institutionalism supports 
the data’s finding that integration levels increase as regime types become more similar 
(lowering the standard deviation between them).  Institutionalism focuses on the 
importance of intergovernmental and supranational institutions.  These can be more 
easily created between states of similar regime type as they have a more mutually agreed 
upon system of government for these institutions to mimic.  Similar reasoning lies behind 
intergovernmentalism’s support of these findings.  The more similar the states are, 
particularly in regime type, the more easily communication between them can be 
facilitated.  Additionally, as both federalism and Monnetism aim towards a complete 
political merging of states, similarity between their regimes is a necessity in order to fit 
them all under an overarching supranational government. 
Theory ↓ StDev Regime Type = ↑ IAS 
↑ Intra-Regional 
Trade = ↑ IAS 
↓ Military Expenditure 
= ↑ IAS 
Intergovernmentalism √  ( √ ) 
Institutionalism √   
Transactionalism ( √ )  √ 
Functionalism  √  
Neofunctionalism ( √ ) √  
Interdependence  √  
Federalism √   
Monnetism √ √  
 Table 11. Theoretical support in findings.  Integration theories’ support for empirical findings are indicated 
by check marks.  Those with parentheses indicate a more indirect though still significant level of support. 
 
Interdependence is the most supportive integration theory for the findings on 
economic trade as it directly expects higher levels of economic interaction (i.e. trade) to 
increase states’ dependence on each other and therefore their integration levels.  
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However, functionalism, neofunctionalism, and Monnetism also provide theoretical 
support for the data as they all expect to see an increase in basic, domestic-level 
interaction between states as the integration process begins.  Trade is a prime example of 
such interaction and therefore should positively correlate with integration levels as the 
findings show. 
Transactionalism supports the data finding military expenditure among states to 
be negatively correlated with their integration levels.  The goal of integration under 
Deutch’s theory is a security community between the states involved, eliminating the 
possibility of war between them.  Therefore, as integration is achieved, it would be 
expected to see military expenditure rates drop.  According to transactionalism, as 
integration increases, security increases.  As security increases, the need for military 
expenditure declines. 
Though the data outlined in the previous section shows the need for more 
thorough research, each variable has displayed the potential to be a significant factor in 
the process of integration.  Each of the findings for the variables observed is supported by 
at least one of the theories on integration.  Furthermore, each of the theories provides 
support the findings of at least one of the variables.  This means that the multiple theories 
behind these variables each have the potential to explain a part of the phenomenon of 
integration.  In other words, integration does not have to be understood as a function of 
one of the theories but rather can be seen as a function of a combination of them.  This 
was assumed during the creation of the model for this research based on a critical 
analysis of the theories themselves and the evidence provided by the development of the 
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EU and ASEAN.  It is now better supported by the data on the three variables drawn from 
the theories showing a relation to integration as measured by the IAS. 
The data needs to be perfected through more extensive and comprehensive 
research.  Once it is, it will offer a stronger empirical view of integration than can be 
provided through simply looking at the history and development of integration in 
individual regions.  This in turn will enable a more thorough critical review of the 
theories through providing a more extensive quality of evidence with which to analyze 
them. 
The eventual goal of this research is to aide in developing an overarching theory 
capable of explaining and predicting integration.  Continued research into the causal 
variables behind the phenomenon will provide a more thorough body of evidence to be 
used in analyzing the theories.  This will allow for a better understanding of each theory’s 
specific strengths and weaknesses.  Increased understanding of the individual integration 
theories is a necessary step in order to properly combine their strengths into a workable, 
overarching, and comprehensive theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
References: 
 
-ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 2010.  
<http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm> 2010, Apr. 17 
 
-Ashley, Richard K.  “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38,  
No. 2 (Spring 1984), p.225-286. 
 
-Chacholiades, Miltiades (1990) International Economics. United States: McGraw-Hill,  
Inc. 
 
-Correlates of War. “Military Expenditure,” National Material Capabilities, Version  
3.02.  
 
-Europa: Gateway to the European Union. 2009. <Http://europa.eu> 2009, Jun. 10 
 
-Genna, Gaspare.  2010.  Integration Achievement Score, Version 4.1. 
 
-Haas, Ernst B. (1975) The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley:  
Institute of International Studies, University of California. 
 
-International Monetary Fund.  2008.  Direction of Trade Statistics.  
 
-Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph (2000) Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition.  New  
York: Longman. 
 
-Krasner, Stephen D. (1983) International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
-Krause, Lawrence B. and Nye, Joseph S.  “Reflections on the Economics and Politics of  
International Economic Organizations,” International Organization, Vol. 29, No.  
1 (Winter 1975), p.331. 
 
-Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2008. Polity IV Project: Political Regime  
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008. Version p4v2008e [Computer File].  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
 
-Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W.  
Norton & Company. 
 
-Mitrany, David.  “The Functional Approach to World Organization,” International  
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1948), p.350-363. 
 
-Nelsen, Brent F. and Stubb, Alexander (2003) The European Union: Readings on the  
Theory and Practice of European Integration, 3rd edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner  
Publishers. 
 85 
 
-Rosamond, Ben (2000) Theories of European Integration (European Union). New York:  
Palgrave. 
 
-Ruggie, John Gerard.  “What Makes the World Hang Together?  Neo-Utilitarianism and  
the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4  
(Autumn 1998), p.855-885. 
 
-Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella (2006) World Politics: The Menu for  
Choice, 8th edition. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth. 
 
-Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution,  
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace,  
War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48. 
 
-Singer, J. David. (1987). "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material  
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985" International Interactions, 14: 115-32. 
 
-Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, 1st edition.  United States:  
McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
 
-Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of  
Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), p.391- 
425. 
 
-World Bank Group.  2010. World Development Indicators and Global Development  
Finance. 
 
-Yesilada, Birol and Wood, David (2009) The Emerging European Union, 5th edition.  
New York: Longman. 
